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Abstract 
 
Budget credibility, the ability of governments to accurately forecast the macro-fiscal 
variables, is crucial for effective Public Finance Management (PFM).  Fiscal marksmanship 
analysis captures the extent of errors in the budgetary forecasting. The fiscal rules can 
determine fiscal marksmanship, as effective fiscal consolidation procedure affects the fiscal 
behaviour of the states in conducting the budgetary forecasts. Against this backdrop, applying Theil’s technique, we analyse the fiscal forecasting errors for 28 States (except Telengana) in 
India for the period 2011-12 to 2015-16. There is a heterogeneity in the magnitude of errors 
across subnational governments in India. The forecast errors in revenue receipts have been 
greater than revenue expenditure. Within revenue receipts, the errors are pronounced more 
significantly in grants component. Within expenditure budgets, the errors in capital spending 
are found greater than revenue spending in all the States.  Partitioning the sources of errors, 
we identified that the errors were more broadly random than systematic bias, except for a 
few crucial macro-fiscal variables where improving the forecasting techniques can provide 
better estimates. 
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Budget credibility is integral to Public Financial Management (PFM). It is the ability of 
the governments to accurately forecast the macro-fiscal variables. Fiscal marksmanship 
captures the extent of errors in the budgetary forecasting. The fiscal rules can determine 
fiscal marksmanship as effective fiscal consolidation procedure affects the fiscal behaviour of 
the states. Even logical and well-written fiscal rules require justification, given that constraining a government’s ability to practice fiscal policy has obvious disadvantages as well 
(Auerbach, 2017). Against this backdrop, we analyse the errors in the budget forecasts in 
India at the State level for the period 2011-12 to 2015-16. The FRBM (Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management) stipulated that States should maintain a fiscal deficit to GDP 
threshold ratio of 3 per cent except for West Bengal, Kerala and Punjab (Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management (FRBM) Committee Report, 2017). The FRBM compliance by the 
States has been rewarded by performance incentive grants by the central government. 
Therefore two issues are relevant here to analyse, (i) the credibility of budget forecasts and 
(ii) if there are any changes in fiscal behaviour of the States ex-post fiscal rules.  
 Technically, the revenue and expenditure forecasts are initially made in the annual 
Budget Speech by the Finance Minister as “Budget Estimates”, and these forecasts are revised after a year which are published as “Revised Estimates”. The Finance Accounts of the States with a lag of one or two years provide the “Actual” figures for audited revenue and expenditure. There is a high likelihood for huge deviations between these three stages.  
 We examine these deviations in macro-fiscal variables for 28 States (except Telengana) in India by employing a technique which estimates the magnitude and the sources of forecast errors. The paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 1 explains what forecast error is and why studying the forecast error is important. Section 2 reviews the fiscal marksmanship analysis. Section 3 explains the data sources and measurement issues. Section 4 presents the magnitude of errors using simple statistical tools. Section 5 carries out the application of the Theil’s U techniques for the evaluation of fiscal marksmanship and identify the systemic and random components of forecast errors for all States in India. Section 6 concludes and draws policy implications. 
 
 
 
                                  
  
   
 
I  What is forecast error and why analyzing forecast error is important? 
 Any budget has three sets of numbers, the budget estimates for the current year, the revised estimates of the ensuing year and the actuals. The credibility of the budget depends on the quality of the budgetary estimates.  
 There can be various issues arising if the government estimates are inaccurate, which at times can have unintended/adverse macroeconomic consequences. In cases where the actual expenditure exceeds the budgeted, there would be an unanticipated need of financing the deficit.   Conversely, if the actual expenditure is less than the budgeted, then there would be idle resources which can otherwise be put to productive use. Therefore, having accurate forecasts are quintessential for proper implementation of the budget.  
 Accurate fiscal forecasts are also important for fiscal management. For instance if a country wants to reduce fiscal deficit, one needs to rely on the accuracy of the budgetary estimates of its revenues and expenditures. Generally, the budgetary estimates will consist of errors i.e. the forecasts would deviate from the actual values. However, not all errors can be treated similarly. Primarily one can distinguish between systematic errors and random errors. The systematic errors can be improved upon by incorporating additional relevant variables or even factoring in the variations in the different variables involved. On the other hand, random errors are the errors which cannot be improved upon by improving upon the forecasting methodologies/techniques and is because of unanticipated and exogenous shock which out of control of the forecaster. Therefore, credible budgetary forecasts would have a higher proportion of random errors compared to systematic error. It is only when the estimates are credible that one can maintain a desired level of fiscal deficit.   
 The Theil’s Index is used in the literature assess the extent of errors. To know the composition of errors we break down the error into systematic error and random error. If the systematic component of error is high, one can improve the forecasting by improving the forecasting method. This can be done adding more variables into the forecasting model or also by incorporating the fluctuations in the variables in the model. In case the random error is high, one cannot improve the forecasting further and the model used to estimate the error is a good model (Theil, H 1958). 
                                  
  
   
 Effective fiscal consolidation at subnational government levels requires a high degree of accuracy in forecasting tax revenue and in estimating public expenditure. Fiscal Marksmanship is an exercise to examine the degree of correspondence between the actual and forecasted revenue and expenditure which will aid in assessing the extent of errors and also the composition of errors. The fiscal marksmanship is significant because the revenue projections/forecasting determine the extent of borrowing requirements to finance the public expenditure.  The public expenditure compression – the significant deviation between “what is budgeted” and “what is actually spent”-  to meet the FRBM targets also have adverse macroeconomic consequences.  
 
II A Review of Fiscal Marksmanship Analysis 
 
The political economy of budget deficit and other macro-fiscal variables have started 
gaining attention since the nineties (Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti, 1995; Blanchard 
Olivier, 1990). However, one of the earlier attempts on fiscal forecast errors was made by 
Allan (1965) in the case of Britain. According to Allan, the importance of fiscal marksmanship 
during that time was because that the margin for error was limited, given the tradeoff 
between inflation and full employment. In such a scenario, accurate predictions of budgetary 
estimates were important to meet the fiscal policy targets of having full employment without undesirably high inflation. Davis (1980), following up on Allan’s study has taken a longer time 
series (from 1951 to 1978).   
 
Auld (1970) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise for Canada for the post war 
period (till 1968). Auld says that if the government is to finance its long range programmes, 
accurate predictions is important. Morrison (1986) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise 
in the United States for the years 1950-1983. Cassidy, Glenn, Mark. S. Kamlet, and Daniel S. 
Nagin (1989) analysed the revenue forecast biases in the context of Europe. The expectations 
of macro-fiscal variables may be subject to error has been recognized as an important part of 
most explanations of the changes in the level of economic activity (Muth, 1961). Fiscal 
marksmanship is the accuracy of budgetary forecasting. Good fiscal marksmanship can be 
one important piece of available information the rational agents must consider in forming 
expectations. The significant variations between actual revenue and expenditure from the 
forecasted budgetary magnitudes could be an indicative of non-optimization or non-
                                  
  
   
attainment of set objectives of fiscal policy. In this context, the role of budget estimates needs 
to be emphasized as fiscal signals (Davis 1980), where he noted that budget estimates have an important ‘signal effect’ on outside forecasters and analysts, with particular attention in recent years focused on the estimated borrowing requirement. If expectations are rational 
rather than adaptive, it is the estimate of taxes and public expenditure in any given budget - 
the ex-ante data, not the observed data that will be used by forward-looking private agents 
who base their decisions in whole or in part on fiscal variables (Morrison, 1986).  
 
In the context of Eurozone, Stephan Andreas and Brück Tilman (2005) have estimated 
the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Their findings show that 
political, electoral cycles and the institutional design of governments affects the quality of 
fiscal forecasts. Their findings against the backdrop of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) suggest incentives for “unobservable fiscal effort” (Beetsma and Jensen 2004) of a malign 
nature, by eurozone governments (compared to other OECD governments) in reporting their 
budget deficits prior to elections. They explained the fiscal behaviour under three cycles- an 
electoral forecast cycle, partisan forecast cycle and an institutional cycle.2 They applied panel 
econometric techniques to the analysis of forecast errors of both euro zone and non-euro 
zone OECD economies. Their findings suggest that the forecast errors are more with election 
cycles in euro zone countries.  
 
Xisco Oliver Joan Rosselló (2016) in the context of Stability and Growth Pact, have 
examined the relationship between fiscal rules and budgetary forecasts by analyzing the 
significance of political and institutional variables in Eurozone. Their findings showed that 
level of public sector debt is crucial in explaining budgetary forecast errors. The electoral 
coincidence, political orientation of ruling parties, tax autonomy and per capita revenue are 
                                                        
2 They emphasized that in an electoral forecast cycle, election date determines the nature of government 
spending and taxation plans, for instance, government may increase public expenditure and revise taxation 
plans prior to election date and manipulate the emerging budget deficit until after the elections. In a 
partisan forecast cycle, they have elaborated that a cyclical behaviour derives from different preferences of 
the political parties and their respective voters. The quality of budget deficit forecasts in such a cycle 
depends on the political orientation of a government, for instance, the left-wing (right-wing) governments 
pursue employment (price stability) at the expense of price stability (employment) which means that tax 
revenues are more (less) difficult to forecast. In an institutional forecast cycle, they elaborated that the 
institutions of governance create incentives for manipulating budget deficit forecasts, for instance, the 
deficit forecasts of a coalition or minority government and a single-party majority governments may not be 
the same. Artis, Michael J. and Massimilano Marcellino (2001) also analysed the forecast errors of OECD 
countries.  
                                  
  
   
the other significant determinants of forecast errors. This study took the literature forward 
to subnational tiers of government in 15 European countries, unlike the earlier studies in the 
context of Eurozone which have confined their analysis on a macroeconomic perspective at 
the national government levels. The Stability and Growth Path therefore creates incentives 
for creative budgetary deficit forecasts prior to election cycles (Strauch et al 2004).   
 
Luisa Giuriato,  Alessandra Cepparulo and Matteo Barberi (2016) analysed the quality 
of fiscal forecasts of 13 EU countries by using annual forecast vintages, 1999-2013 against 
the backdrop of Stability and Convergence Programme. They found that if fiscal rules counter the executive’s monopoly of fiscal forecasting, strengthening the legislature’s formal powers 
negatively influences the fiscal forecast accuracy. Pina Álvaro and Nuno Venes (2011) analysed the budget balance forecasts prepared by 15 European countries in their “Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP)”reportings. They found that growth surprises, fiscal institutions, 
elections cycle, forms of fiscal governance and numerical expenditure rules (unlike deficit and 
debt rules) affect the forecast errors.  
 
There have been a number of fiscal marksmanship exercises in the case of India 
(Bhattacharya, and Kumari 1988). In one of the earlier attempts at analyzing budgetary 
estimates in India (for 1956-64), Paul and Rangarajan (1974) has done an analysis of two 
components of the capital expenditure of the state and union budget, namely construction 
and industrial development (the analysis was limited to these two because of the scope of the 
subject matter they were dealing with). In this study, the analysis of forecasting errors were 
based largely on graphs plotting the actual expenditure and the budget estimates. In their 
analysis, it is stated that while in both the components the budget estimates of the center was 
more accurate compared to the state. This difference was attributed to the different in 
efficiency in the budgetary process.  
 
Asher (1978) has performed a more comprehensive fiscal marksmanship exercise for 
India for the period 1967-68 to 1975-76 for both the revised and budget estimates. The study 
showed that during that period, both the revenues and expenditures were consistently 
underestimated.  However, it was observed that the extent of error for the expenditure side 
was larger.  
 
                                  
  
   
Chakrabarty and Varghese (1982) have used data from 1970-71 to 1979-80. One of the 
major findings of that study was that both revenues and expenditure are underestimated. 
Pattnaik (1990) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise using the Theil’s Index for the 
period 1951 to 1989. The study observes that the errors in the revised estimates are lower 
than the errors in the budget estimate (although there are large errors in both). It is stated 
that largely most of the errors in the estimates are systematic in nature for both the entire 
time period as well as sub time periods (the systematic errors were maximum for the period 
1981 to 1989).  
 
More recent studies on fiscal marksmanship in India have a different conclusion. A 
study done by K Nitin and Roy (2015) using data from 1990-91 to 2011-12 observes that the 
source of error in components such as tax revenue, non-tax revenue, interest payments, 
defense revenue expenditure, plan revenue expenditure and fiscal deficit were primarily due 
to random error (in the paper, if the proportion of the random error is more than any of the 
bias component or the error in variance). The rest of the components such as subsidy 
expenditure, non-plan revenue expenditure, capital expenditure and non-debt capital 
receipts had a higher systematic error (mean error and slope error). A very interesting point 
made in the paper is that while there is an attempt to have fiscal consolidation by controlling 
expenditure, the predictability of expenditure is quite low compared to revenue. In a similar 
study, Chakraborty and Sinha (2018) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise for the period 
1990-1991 to 2016-17 and have come up with a similar conclusion.  
A trend which is observed based on the empirical literature is that from 1951 to 1990, 
the systematic component of the error was higher, from 1990 to 2016-17, the random 
component is higher compared to the systematic component. It is worth noting that, that 
these studies are based on data of the union government. Shrestha and Chakraborty (2019) is the only study that has examined the fiscal marksmanship in the context of a State in India. Their study focused on Kerala, and identified forecast errors with respect to tax revenue projections.  
In the recent empirical literature, the fiscal forecast errors are analysed against the 
backdrop of fiscal rules. The political economy of fiscal forecasts at the subnational level 
depend on the tax autonomy and the nature of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
mechanism.  The tax autonomy is heterogeneous across States. The intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers may be progressive if the transfer is designed to offset the inter-state fiscal 
                                  
  
   
disabilities.  
In India, the Finance Bill 2018 has incorporated a few clauses (clauses 207–10) to amend FRBM Act, 2003, with special reference to eliminate the reference to “revenue balance” and using fiscal deficit as an operational parameter (Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 
2018). Against these policy changes, it is pertinent to analyse the impact of fiscal rules on 
fiscal marksmanship of macro-fiscal variables in India. Buiter and Patel (2011) have analysed 
the fiscal rules in India, however the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal marksmanship in the 
context of India has not been analysed. As mentioned above, Nitin and Roy (2014) have 
analysed the normative fiscal assessments of the Finance Commission (FC) of India, and 
realization of fiscal policy with regard to Central Finances over the period 1990–2012. The recent empirical literature on fiscal marksmanship is highly confined to the forecast errors of national governments in India (Chakraborty and Sinha, 2018, Nitin and Roy, 2014). There have been virtually no effort in doing a fiscal marksmanship exercise at the state 
level. In this paper, we attempt to do a fiscal marksmanship exercise at the state level from 
the year 2010-11 to 2015-16; analyzing the magnitude of the errors of the states and 
subsequently examining the nature of the errors. This is done in two ways: a) Firstly to check 
whether the errors are overestimates or under-estimates and b) To check the extent of 
systematic and random components in these fiscal forecast errors.  
III Data and Measurement Issues 
 
The data is organized from Finance Accounts of various States and CSO. The forecast error is defined as deviation between what is predicted (as Budget Estimates or Revised Estimate) and what is Actual.  The summary statistics usually used to measure forecasting errors in the empirical literature are the following (Gonza lez Cabanillas, Laura and Alessio Terzi, 2012).  
 
III.1: The Mean Error  
 The mean error (ME) refers to the average difference between the forecast and the actual.  The mean error has been calculated by taking the average of the difference between the Predicted values (of both BE and RE) and the actuals over the period 2011/12 to 2015/16. We have divided the mean error by the sum of actuals of the reference period for a meaningful 
                                  
  
   inference from data. The Mean error is a crude measure of quality of forecast as positive and negative errors can offset each other, thereby not giving us the exact magnitude of error. However, The ME is a pointer to a possible bias in the forecast.  
 
III.2: The Root Mean Square Error  
 The root mean squared error (RMSE) is a measure of the relative size of the forecast error. In this paper, to calculate the RMSE the mean squared error is taken over the reference period after which the square root of the MSE is calculated. While this will give us the magnitude of error, it will not give any information on the direction of the error, i.e. whether the error is positive or negative. We have taken the RMSE as a proportion of the sum of actuals of the reference period. It takes reflects the fact that large forecast errors are more significant than small differences.  
 
III.3: Theil’s Inequality Coefficients (U)  
 Theil’s inequality coefficient (U) is used to analyze the measure of accuracy of the budget forecasts. Theils’ inequality coefficient is based on the mean square prediction error. 
The forecast error of Theil (1958) is defined as: 
 
U1 =                                   (1) 
 
where 
U1 = inequality coefficient 
Pt = Predicted value 
At = Actual value 
n = the number of years 
 
This inequality coefficient ranges from zero to one. When Pt = At for all observations (a 
perfect forecast), U1 equals zero3.  
                                                        
3 Theils’ second equation for inequality coefficient, which uses a revised measure of forecast error. Theil’s 
(1966 and 1971) revised measure of inequality is as follows. 
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The mean square prediction error (U1) has been decomposed in order to indicate 
systematic and random sources of error. The systematic component is further divided into 
the proportion of the total forecast error due to bias and the proportion of total forecast error 
attributable to unequal variation. The derivation of equation 4 is given in detail in Davis 
(1980). 
 
1 =                  (2) 
 
In equation (2), P and A are mean predicted and mean actual changes respectively; Sp 
and Sa are the standard deviations of predicted and actual values respectively; and r is the 
coefficient of correlation between predicted and actual values. 
  
The first expression of RHS of equation (2) is the proportion of the total forecast error 
due to bias. It represents a measure of proportion of error due to over prediction or under 
prediction of the average value. The second expression of the RHS of equation (2) is the 
proportion of total forecast error attributable to unequal variation. In other words, it 
measures the proportion of error due to over prediction or under prediction of the variance 
of the values. The third expression on the RHS of the equation (2) measures the proportion 
of forecasting error due to random variation.  
 
                                                        
U2 =                                      
 
This measure has an advantage that denominator does not contain P and the inequality coefficient does not 
depend on the forecast. In perfect forecast, U2 equals to zero. U2 does not have an upper bound.  
 
A more rigorous measure of Theil’s inequality statistics is also used, by incorporating the lags in the actuals 
and the difference of predicted value from the lag of the actuals to capture the magnitude of error. 
U3 =                                  
Where a= At-At-1 
Pt = Pt-At-1 
n= no: of years 
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The first two sources of error are systematic. Presumably they can be reduced by the 
improved forecasting techniques; while the random component is beyond the controller of 
the forecaster (Intriligator, 1978; Pindyck and Rubenfield, 1998; Theil, 1966).  
 
III.3: Magnitude of Forecasting Errors 
 
 Our analysis showed that in 28 States, the overestimation of revenue receipts amount to 1.18 percent of GSDP, with respect to the forecast deviation between Budget Estimates (BE) and Actuals. The same ratio however has slightly reduced to 1.03 per cent for Revised Estimates (RE) and Actuals. The underestimation (negative deviations of BE and Actuals) of revenue however is negligible (Table 1).  
 The State’s own tax revenue alone showed 0.40 per cent overestimation as per cent of GSDP for all States with regard to forecast errors between BE and Actuals. The errors reduced to 0.22 per cent of GSDP for RE-Actuals. The State’s own non-tax revenue was cumulatively overestimated to the range of 0.11 per cent while the Central transfers was overestimated to the range of 0.14 per cent of GSDP. It would be interesting to analyse the reasons of this forecast errors in central transfers to all states. The design of cess and surcharges is an additional dimension for the reduction in the divisible tax pool central transfers to the States. The cumulative forecast errors/deviation between BE and Actuals was relatively higher for grants than tax transfers to all States, at a range of 0.66 per cent for BE-Actuals (Table 1).    
 The cumulative overestimation of revenue expenditure of all States over the period 2011-12 to 2015-16 was 1.05 per cent of GSDP with respect to the forecast errors between BE and Actuals (Table 2) . Within the revenue expenditure, the overestimation of social services (0.53 % with respect to RE-Actuals) is the higher than economic services and general services. This is broadly giving an indication that against the backdrop of fiscal rules at subnational level, expenditure compression happens more with the social sector spending. The cumulative overestimation of general services is 0.34 per cent for BE-Actuals and lesser at 0.17 per cent for RE-Actuals.  
 
 
 
 
                                  
  
   
 
Table 1: Deviation between BE/RE and Actuals in Revenue Receipts as Percent of 
GSDP, 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
Table 2: Deviation between BE/RE and Actuals in Revenue Expenditure: as % of GSDP, 
2011/12-2015/16 
 
  Revenue 
Expenditure(total) 
Social Services Economic 
Services 
General Services 
  BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
Over-estimation as a % of 
All State GSDP 
1.05% 1.29% 0.37% 0.53% 0.19% 0.39% 0.34% 0.17% 
Under-estimation as a % of 
All State GSDP 
-0.01% -0.10% -0.02% -0.05% -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% -0.05% 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
Table 3: Deviation between BE/RE and Actuals in Capital Expenditure, as % of GSDP, 
2011/12-2015/16 
 
  Capital 
Expenditure 
(total) 
Social Services Economic 
Services 
General Services 
  BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
Over-estimation as a % of All 
State GSDP 
0.39% 0.38% 0.15% 0.14% 0.20% 0.19% 0.08% 0.06% 
Under-estimation as a % of All 
State GSDP 
-0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.05% -0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 The cumulative overestimation of capital expenditure over the period under analysis was to extent of 0.38 per cent of GSDP for both BE-Actuals and RE-Actuals (Table 3).  
 Revenue Receipts States’ Own Tax 
Revenue 
State’s Own Non 
Tax Revenue 
Share in Central 
Taxes 
Grants From Center 
  BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
BE-
Actuals 
RE-
Actuals 
Over-
estimation as 
a % of All State 
GSDP 
1.20% 1.05% 0.40% 0.22% 0.11% 0.08% 0.14% 0.12% 0.67% 0.66% 
Under-
estimation as 
a % of All State 
GSDP 
0.00% -0.08% -0.04% -0.07% -0.04% -0.03% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% 
                                  
  
   
 
III.3.1: Mean Error (ME) and Root of Mean Error Square (RMSE) 
 Analyzing the mean error and root of mean squared error, we find that the values of MSE and RMSE (as a proportion of actuals) seems to be higher in the case of capital expenditure compared to revenue expenditure. This is true of almost all of states. Only in case of Haryana, Karnataka and Odisha, the MSE (as a proportion of actuals) is higher in revenue expenditure compared to capital expenditure (Table 4). Furthermore, only in Himachal, Karnataka, Kerala and Uttarakhand the RMSE as proportion of actuals is higher in case of revenue expenditure compared to capital expenditure. Secondly, the MSE and RMSE (as a proportion of actuals) is higher in case of non-tax revenue (including grants) compared to tax revenue (including tax transfers) at the all-state level. The all state ME as a proportion of actuals for total tax revenue is 0.0496 and the all-state ME for non-tax revenue as a proportion of actuals is 0.2049. Similarly in the case of RMSE, the all-state RMSE as a proportion of actuals for total tax revenue is 548.09 and the same for non-tax revenue is 1140.79. The main reason the ME and RMSE are higher for non-tax revenue is because the value of these two indicators are very high for the grants from the center. The RMSE as a proportion of actuals for grants from the center is 1157.62 and the RMSE for States own non tax revenue is only 372.02. Similarly, mean error of states own tax revenue is only 0.0544 whereas it is 0.282 for grants from the center.  
                                  
 
  
   
Table 4: Mean Error (ME) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE): Budget Estimates (BE) and Actuals 
States  State Own 
Tax 
Revenue 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
States Own 
Non Tax 
Revenue 
Grants 
from 
Center 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Revenue 
Deficit 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Primary 
Deficit 
 Andhra Pradesh  0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.14 0.02 0.07 -0.45 -0.04 -0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.17 -0.08 -0.16 
         
 Arunachal Pradesh  0.08 0.01 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.75 -0.07 3.19 13.61 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.27 -0.91 -3.98 
         
 Assam  0.07 0.05 0.10 0.51 0.33 1.56 1.42 0.64 0.93 
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.24 -0.50 -0.23 -0.34 
         
 Bihar  0.07 0.04 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.34 -1.52 1.18 2.39 
0.02 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.46 -0.27 -0.55 
         
 Chhattisgarh  0.11 0.06 0.26 0.54 0.17 0.31 0.96 0.19 0.26 
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.38 -0.13 -0.20 
         
 Goa  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.61 0.09 0.67 -8.79 0.90 4.02 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 2.19 -0.25 -1.07 
         
 Gujarat  0.00 0.07 0.04 0.35 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.12 
         
 Haryana  0.06 0.04 0.07 0.54 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.49 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.21 
         
 Himachal Pradesh  -0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.02 0.77 
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.23 -0.03 -0.35 
         
 Jammu and 
Kashmir  
0.05 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.56 7.68 -0.05 -0.16 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.10 1.38 -0.29 -0.89 
         
 Jharkhand  0.15 0.04 0.19 0.86 0.22 0.31 0.81 0.09 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.25 -0.10 -0.21 
         
 Karnataka  -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.34 0.25 -0.02 -0.43 0.03 0.06 
                                  
 
  
   0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.15 -0.03 -0.05 
         
 Kerala  0.06 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.60 0.43 0.92 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.36 -0.24 -0.50 
         
 Madhya Pradesh  0.01 0.05 0.02 0.29 0.10 0.07 -0.21 0.28 0.71 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.20 
         
 Maharashtra  0.01 0.00 0.12 0.40 0.06 0.14 0.37 0.18 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.07 -0.64 
         
 Manipur  0.08 0.04 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.33 -0.02 1.41 -4.61 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.32 1.05 
         
States  State Own 
Tax 
Revenue 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
States Own 
Non Tax 
Revenue 
Grants 
from 
Center 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Revenue 
Deficit 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Primary 
Deficit 
 Meghalaya  -0.02 0.06 0.17 0.66 0.28 0.47 1.50 -0.20 -0.44 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.34 -0.17 -0.28 
         
 Mizoram  -0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.40 -0.88 0.90 2.31 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.54 -0.40 -0.97 
         
 Nagaland  -0.05 0.00 -0.11 0.09 0.14 0.29 -0.27 1.10 -20.32 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.32 5.69 
         
 Orissa  -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.39 0.12 0.03 -0.40 0.80 2.71 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.22 -1.12 
         
 Punjab  0.09 0.03 0.51 0.37 0.08 0.77 -0.20 -0.49 -1.76 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.17 -0.04 -0.18 -0.67 
         
 Rajasthan  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.06 0.12 2.16 0.18 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.63 -0.04 -0.07 
         
 Sikkim  -0.07 0.04 0.27 0.47 0.19 0.71 0.67 0.76 -127.83 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.13 -0.29 34.27 
         
 Tamil Nadu  0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.14 -0.31 0.03 0.07 
                                  
 
  
   0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.06 
         
 Tripura  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.30 0.06 1.26 -2.47 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.45 0.66 
         
 Uttar Pradesh  0.03 0.05 0.07 0.33 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 
         
 Uttarakhand  -0.85 -0.48 -0.82 0.06 -0.60 -0.27 9.86 -0.74 -0.79 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.06 1.84 -0.20 -0.26 
         
 West Bengal  0.02 0.04 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.34 -0.15 0.03 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.28 
         
Note: the first figure is ME and the second figure is RMSE respectively.  
Source: (Basic data), Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Table 5: Mean Error (ME) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE): Revised Estimates 
(BE) and Actuals 
 
States 
 
State 
Own 
Tax 
Revenue 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
States 
Own 
Non Tax 
Revenue 
Grants 
from 
Center 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Revenue 
Deficit 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Primary 
Deficit 
Andhra Pradesh 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.12 -0.4 -0.14 -0.27 
         
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
0.02 0 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.64 2.72 0.08 0 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.36 0.56 -2.03 -8.84 
         
Assam 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.07 0.31 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.79 -1.27 -0.3 -0.44 
         
Bihar 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.3 0.24 0.48 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.17 1.07 -0.58 -1.18 
         
Chhattisgarh 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.81 -0.2 -0.31 
         
Goa 0.01 0.01 0 0.12 0.02 0.13 -1.76 0.18 0.8 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.34 0.04 0.32 4.7 -0.42 -1.84 
         
Gujarat 0 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.27 -0.04 -0.18 
         
Haryana 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.11 -0.1 -0.23 -0.45 
         
Himachal 
Pradesh 
0 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.17 0 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.66 -0.03 -0.74 
         
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0 0.11 1.54 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.1 0.01 0.28 3.68 -0.09 -0.23 
         
Jharkhand 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.41 0.1 0.15 0.56 -0.14 -0.29 
         
Karnataka 0 0 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.22 -0.02 -0.04 
         
Kerala 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.14 -0.81 -0.53 -1.12 
         
Madhya Pradesh 0 0.01 0 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.17 -0.15 -0.4 
         
Maharashtra 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.01 0 0.05 0.2 0.03 0.08 -0.31 -0.1 -0.96 
         
Manipur 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.07 0 0.28 -0.92 0.07 0.03 0.2 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.12 -0.71 2.3 
                                  
 
  
   
         
Meghalaya 0 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.3 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.18 0.33 0.16 0.23 0.77 -0.25 -0.55 
         
Mizoram -0.01 0 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.18 0.18 0.46 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.2 1.14 -0.56 -1.44 
         
Nagaland -0.01 0 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.22 -4.06 0.04 0 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.18 -0.52 9.73 
         
Orissa 0 0 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.16 0.54 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.18 -0.37 -1.67 
         
Punjab 0.09 0.03 0.51 0.37 0.08 0.77 -0.2 -0.49 -1.76 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.21 0.04 0.37 -0.1 -0.41 -1.49 
         
Rajasthan 0 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.04 0.06 0.02 0 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.06 -1.29 -0.08 -0.14 
         
States 
 
State 
Own 
Tax 
Revenue 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
States 
Own 
Non Tax 
Revenue 
Grants 
from 
Center 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Revenue 
Deficit 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Primary 
Deficit 
Sikkim -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.15 -25.57 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.32 0.31 -0.37 62.99 
         
Tamil Nadu 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.27 -0.03 -0.07 
         
Tripura 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.25 -0.49 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.12 -0.65 1.33 
         
Uttar Pradesh 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.2 -0.06 -0.15 
         
Uttarakhand -0.17 -0.1 -0.16 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 1.97 -0.15 -0.16 0.39 0.22 0.37 0.03 0.28 0.14 6.34 -0.38 -0.55 
         
West Bengal 0 0.01 0.04 0.03 0 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.16 -0.14 -0.07 -0.6 
         
Note: the first figure is MSE and the second figure is RMSE respectively.  
Source: (Basic data), Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
III.3.2:  Forecasting Errors: Overestimate or Underestimate? 
 One of limitations of RMSE is that we cannot find the sign of the error, i.e. whether the error was positive or negative. We attempt to calculate fiscal marksmanship indices in this section which would help us assess whether the budgetary estimates are overestimates or 
                                  
 
  
   underestimates.  This ratio would give us information on whether the BE (RE) is an underestimate or an overestimate. If the values of the ratio is above 1, this indicates that on average, the indicator has been overestimated. Conversely, if the value is below 1 it can be said that it is an underestimate. In case of BE, it can be observed that most of the categories are overestimated in both the revenue and the expenditure side.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio: Revenue and its 
Components (BE/ Actuals) 
 
 Total 
Revenue 
Receipt 
Tax 
Revenue 
States 
Own Tax 
Revenue 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
Non Tax 
Revenue 
States 
Own Tax 
Revenue 
Grants 
From 
Center 
Median 1.115 1.029 1.003 1.056 1.210 1.120 1.332 
Mean 1.118 1.039 1.097 1.038 1.241 1.156 1.325 
Max 1.360 1.223 1.072 1.166 1.698 2.191 2.121 
Min 1.012 0.916 0.952 0.866 0.839 0.828 0.803 
Standard Deviation 0.087 0.056 0.077 0.053 0.199 0.280 0.269 
Source: (Basic data), Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) On the total revenue receipt, all the states have the overall revenue overestimated ranging from a maximum value of 1.36 (Meghalaya) and a minimum value of 1.01 (Rajasthan). The median value of total revenue receipt is 1.12 (Table 6).  Correspondingly, both the tax revenue and non-tax revenue are generally overestimated. However, there are a few states where there has been underestimation of tax revenue and non-tax revenue. Tax Revenue was underestimated in Karnataka and Orissa, and Non Tax Revenues were underestimated in Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan. An interesting observation from the data is that the standard deviation of this index for the non-tax revenues (for both the components states own non-tax revenue and grants from the center) were considerably higher than the tax revenues. In the table 6, the standard deviation for tax revenue is 0.053, whereas the standard deviation of non-tax revenue is 0.199. This shows that the ratio of BE and actuals are relatively more spread compared to tax revenues.  An observation which is worth noting is that the higher standard deviation of the ratio of BE and actuals for non-tax revenue compared to tax revenue complements the fact that the ME and the RMSE also had similar trend. Coupling the results from the previous and this section, one can conclude that while the BEs are generally overestimated for both tax revenues and non-tax revenues, the errors are generally higher for non-tax revenues compared to tax revenues.  
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio: Revenue Expenditure 
 
 Revenue 
Expenditure 
Social 
Services 
Economic 
Services 
Non Developmental 
Expenditure 
Median 1.072 1.074 1.069 1.040 
Mean 1.094 1.086 1.117 1.055 
Max 1.279 1.432 1.715 1.319 
Min 0.950 0.866 0.895 0.920 
Standard Deviation 0.084 0.122 0.174 0.088 
Source: (Basic data), Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 When we consider the expenditure side, we can observe that it is generally the case that both revenue expenditure and capital expenditure have been overestimated.  In case of revenue expenditure all of the states except Nagaland and Assam have underestimates. In case of capital expenditure, all the states besides Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have overestimates. However, one trend that can observed is the range and standard deviation of capital expenditure is much higher compared to revenue expenditure (both overall and component wise). The maximum and the minimum of the revenue expenditure is 1.279 and 0.95 respectively for revenue expenditure (Table 7). This range is considerably lower compared to the maximum and minimum of this index for capital expenditure which is 2.476 and 0.956 respectively (Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio: Capital Expenditure 
 
  Capital 
Expenditure 
Social 
Services 
Economic 
Services 
Non 
Developmental 
Expenditure 
Median 1.269 1.306 1.185 1.368 
Mean 1.335 1.446 1.197 1.941 
Max 2.476 3.305 2.113 9.879 
Min 0.956 0.659 0.570 0.800 
Standard Deviation 0.359 0.555 0.330 1.765 
Source: (Basic data), Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 The standard deviation for capital expenditure is 0.359 which is around fourfold higher than the standard deviation of revenue expenditure (Table 8). It was observed in the previous 
                                  
 
  
   section that the MSE and RMSE are higher for capital expenditure compared to revenue expenditure. Since most of the states had overestimates of both the revenue and capital expenditure it can be concluded that the forecasting errors in capital expenditure tends to be higher compared to revenue expenditure.  
 
III.4:  State-wise Fiscal marksmanship Ratios of Macro-fiscal variables  
 For fiscal marksmanship ratios, we have divided the BE by the Actual values and taken the average for the year 2011-12 to 2015-16. Therefore, if the values in the figures 1-5 is above 1, this indicates that on average, the indicator has been overestimated. Conversely, if the value is below 1 it can be said that it is underestimated. In case of BE, it can be observed that most of the categories are overestimated in both the revenue and the expenditure side. It can be observed that both the mean and median are over 1, indicating most of them are overestimated. When we observe the state wise trend, most of the categories have more than 20 states have an overestimate. One can observe a similar trend in the case RE. On average both the revenue and expenditure have been overestimated. In most of the categories there have been overestimate in over 20 states. It is worth noting that while most of the categories have overestimates, in case of revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and primary deficit merely 11, 18 and 16 states had underestimates. This is a trend similar to the BE.  The fiscal marksmanship ratios suggest that forecast errors in grants is greater than other macro-fiscal variables (figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
 
Figure 1: Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio of Own Tax revenue 
 Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 2: Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio of Tax Transfer 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 3: Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio of Grants 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 4: Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio of Revenue Expenditure 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40
Arunachal Pradesh
Mizoram
Rajasthan
West Bengal
Jammu and Kashmir
Maharashtra
Tamil Nadu
Himachal
Gujarat
Manipur
Nagaland
Punjab
Haryana
Uttar Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Tripura
Orissa
Uttarakhand
Andhra Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Bihar
Sikkim
Kerala
Jharkhand
Assam
Karnataka
Meghalaya
0.95
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.01
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.07
1.07
1.08
1.11
1.12
1.12
1.13
1.13
1.13
1.15
1.16
1.19
1.21
1.22
1.24
1.28
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 5: Fiscal Marksmanship Ratio of Capital Expenditure 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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IV.  Analyzing the Forecast Errors using Theil’s U 
 
The U1 of the Theil’s index has a lower limit of 0 (which is the case of perfect forecast) 
and an upper limit of 1 (which is the highest forecasting error). We will state some of the 
observations on the forecasting errors and elaborate on it using some basic statistical 
indicators. 
 
IV.1: The forecasting errors in most of the macro-fiscal indicators in most of states are generally 
low in both the revised and the budget estimate, to below 0.20 in a range of 0-1, with zero being 
perfect forecast and one , the imperfect forecast.  
 
In the case of Budget Estimate, the average forecasting error in most of the revenue and 
expenditure are below 0.20. Furthermore, almost all of the variables (except the revenue 
deficit) is positively skewed (since median < mean). This means that a lot of the observations 
are clustered in to the left side of the interval of U1 (i.e. 0 and 1), and most of them are below 
0.20. One can observe that on average, both revenue and expenditure variables have low 
forecasting errors. We observe that the all-state average for total revenue receipt is 0.09. The 
all State average forecast error for the tax revenue is 0.074, and for non-tax revenue is 0.15. 
In case of the expenditure variables, the all India average is 0.08 for revenue expenditure and 
0.177 for capital expenditure.  
 
When we look at the error in estimating the fiscal deficit, the U1 for fiscal deficit on 
average is 0.302. The states which have fiscal deficit forecast errors greater than 0.5 are only 
four, viz., Arunachal Pradesh (0.818), Assam (0.554), Mizoram (0.617) and Punjab (0.866).  
In case of revenue deficit, the value of U1 was higher at 0.432. Seven States are with U1 higher 
than 0.5, viz., Andhra Pradesh (0.672), Assam (0.94), Goa (0.59), Jammu and Kashmir (0.861), 
Kerala (0.532), Uttar Pradesh (0.669) and West Bengal (0.636).   
 
A very similar observation can be made regarding the revised estimates (Tables 9 and 
10). The average forecasting error in most of the revenue and expenditure are below 0.20. 
Similar to BE, all the variables are positively skewed. It is worth noting that in most of the 
major revenue and expenditure variables RE is better forecasted than BE (on average) (tables 
9 and 10). For all the macro-fiscal variables among the states, the value of U1 in RE is lower 
than BE.  
                                  
 
  
   
IV.2: States having magnitude of errors above 0.30 threshold are as low as four in case of 
expenditure and 10 in case of revenue receipts 
 Applying the Theil’s U, we have estimated the errors between the BE and the Actuals; 
and the RE and the Actuals. As mentioned above, the range of U1 is between zero and one, the 
value zero of U1 equals to perfect forecast. Figures 6 to 11 depict the magnitude of errors of 
macro-fiscal variables of subnational governments in India. The Maximum-Minimum range  
of   U1 for BE-Actuals revealed that the range of errors in revenue receipts is the higher than 
that of revenue expenditure and capital expenditure (Max for 0.83 in case of Arunachal 
Pradesh to minimum for  0.07 in case of Uttarakhand, figure 9).The U1 magnitude of forecasts 
for the revenue receipts also revealed that around 10 States have magnitude of error greater 
than 0.30, viz, Arunachal Pradesh 90.83), Tripura (0.63), Punjab (0.63), Tamil Nadu (0.53), 
Nagaland (0.53), Mizoram (0.52), Assam (0.51), Jammu and Kashmir (0.47), Goa (0.45) and 
Uttar Pradesh (0.34).  
On the contrary, the magnitude of errors above 0.30 threshold in case of revenue 
expenditure are noted for only 4 States, viz., Jammu and Kashmir (0.50), Punjab and 
Assam(0.37) and Arunachal Pradesh (0.30) (Figure 10). In case of capital expenditure also, 
magnitude of error is highest in case of Jammu and Kashmir at 0.48, followed by Punjab 
(0.39), Assam (0.37), Goa (0.311) and Arunachal Pradesh (0.25). The minimum error in 
capital expenditure forecast is noted for Karnataka at 0.034 (figure 11).  
Looking at the end of the tail, around 16 states have magnitude of error lower than 0.15 
threshold in case of revenue expenditure (figure 10); on the contrary the lower end of the tail 
is scarce for revenue receipts with only 8 state have revenue receipts forecast errors less than 
0.15 threshold(figure 9). The lower end of forecast errors in capital expenditure, below 0.15 
threshold was noted for 15 States.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 6: U1 for Revenue Deficit: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 7: U1 for Fiscal Deficit: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 8: U1 for Primary Deficit: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 9: U1 for Revenue Receipts: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-
16 
 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 10: U1 for Revenue Expenditure: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 
2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 11: U1 for Capital Expenditure: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 
2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Table 9: Magnitude of Errors in Public Expenditure: Revenue and Capital – 
Comparison of BE-Actuals and RE-Actuals 
 Revenue Expenditure Capital expenditure 
  BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
Andhra Pradesh 0.072 0.051 0.180 0.053 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.063 0.058 0.253 0.289 
Assam 0.108 0.155 0.374 0.435 
Bihar 0.077 0.119 0.066 0.127 
Chhattisgarh 0.077 0.087 0.162 0.134 
Goa 0.068 0.049 0.311 0.259 
Gujarat 0.031 0.022 0.063 0.036 
Haryana 0.039 0.047 0.131 0.096 
Himachal  0.027 0.041 0.062 0.042 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
0.118 0.098 0.483 0.447 
Jharkhand 0.084 0.090 0.146 0.117 
Karnataka 0.168 0.170 0.034 0.042 
Kerala 0.152 0.126 0.168 0.115 
Madhya Pradesh 0.038 0.047 0.052 0.039 
Maharashtra 0.020 0.039 0.106 0.077 
Manipur 0.056 0.072 0.135 0.127 
Meghalaya 0.150 0.145 0.202 0.198 
Mizoram 0.030 0.080 0.173 0.229 
Nagaland 0.056 0.072 0.150 0.129 
Orissa 0.064 0.059 0.056 0.024 
Punjab 0.029 0.046 0.389 0.257 
Rajasthan 0.018 0.028 0.088 0.058 
Sikkim 0.089 0.091 0.241 0.271 
Tamil Nadu 0.026 0.024 0.125 0.074 
Tripura 0.059 0.056 0.200 0.129 
Uttarakhand 0.039 0.034 0.055 0.052 
Uttar Pradesh 0.082 0.055 0.080 0.105 
West Bengal 0.016 0.015 0.217 0.144 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
  
                                  
 
  
   
IV.3:  Disaggregating the Revenue Receipts  
A pertinent question is, why is it that the forecasting errors are  much higher in the 
revenue receipts in case of 10 states above 0.30 threshold as compared to capital expenditure 
(only 4 states) and revenue expenditure (only 4 states)? Which component of revenue 
receipts showed erratic range in forecasts – own tax revenue, tax transfers or grants from 
centre?  
The disaggregated analysis of revenue receipts showed that magnitude of errors in 
grants is relatively higher than the forecast errors in own tax revenue and share in central 
taxes.  If we take a relative threshold of magnitude of errors at 0.10 , the number of states 
having forecast errors above 0.10 in case of own tax revenue (figure 12) and tax transfers 
(figure 13) are only three states, while the number of states having forecast errors above 0.10 
in case of grants is as high as 23 States (figure 14).  The three states showing forecast error 
magnitude above 0.10 in case of own tax revenue are Jammu and Kashmir (0.361), Andhra 
Pradesh (0.157) and Assam (0.101).  In case of tax transfers, the three states that have shown 
forecast errors magnitude above 0.10 are Jammu &Kashmir (0.361), Tripura (0.17) and 
Andhra Pradesh (0.114). As high as 23 states have shown forecast errors in grants greater 
than 0.10, except for Maharashtra (0.088), Nagaland (0.069), Mizoram (0.06), Manipur 
(0.058) and Himachal Pradesh (0.034) (figure 14).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 12: Own tax revenue: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 13: Tax Transfers: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Figure 14: Grants: Magnitude of Errors (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
                                  
 
  
   
Table 10:    Magnitude of Errors: Comparison of BE-Actuals with RE-Actuals for Revenue and its Components 
 Revenue receipts Own Tax Revenue Tax Transfers Own Non-Tax Revenue Grants 
  BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
Andhra Pradesh 0.121 0.043 0.157 0.018 0.114 0.002 0.099 0.018 0.138 0.162 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.076 0.090 0.072 0.012 0.014 0.004 0.149 0.111 0.126 0.137 
Assam 0.124 0.095 0.101 0.032 0.027 0.033 0.155 0.056 0.271 0.247 
Bihar 0.082 0.073 0.089 0.028 0.030 0.020 0.338 0.171 0.211 0.220 
Chhattisgarh 0.090 0.094 0.065 0.054 0.031 0.025 0.152 0.146 0.199 0.200 
Goa 0.060 0.027 0.046 0.018 0.032 0.016 0.078 0.030 0.340 0.298 
Gujarat 0.043 0.047 0.039 0.072 0.055 0.026 0.067 0.046 0.176 0.147 
Haryana 0.055 0.038 0.056 0.027 0.032 0.035 0.121 0.065 0.207 0.199 
Himachal  0.054 0.054 0.035 0.141 0.052 0.059 0.130 0.112 0.034 0.041 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.271 0.266 0.290 0.315 0.361 0.353 0.188 0.237 0.346 0.317 
Jharkhand 0.120 0.116 0.097 0.205 0.073 0.021 0.133 0.184 0.324 0.277 
Karnataka 0.064 0.081 0.014 0.095 0.036 0.013 0.045 0.067 0.170 0.165 
Kerala 0.054 0.063 0.073 0.085 0.040 0.017 0.065 0.028 0.129 0.119 
Madhya Pradesh 0.161 0.145 0.036 0.221 0.064 0.024 0.122 0.048 0.167 0.135 
Maharashtra 0.051 0.040 0.026 0.069 0.035 0.001 0.161 0.078 0.088 0.181 
Manipur 0.134 0.098 0.066 0.654 0.033 0.028 0.222 0.179 0.058 0.078 
Meghalaya 0.177 0.183 0.082 0.305 0.031 0.030 0.175 0.169 0.271 0.261 
Mizoram 0.095 0.115 0.088 0.532 0.034 0.023 0.116 0.103 0.060 0.089 
Nagaland 0.084 0.111 0.038 0.709 0.026 0.003 0.104 0.128 0.069 0.045 
Orissa 0.088 0.117 0.021 0.221 0.054 0.016 0.121 0.075 0.148 0.158 
Punjab 0.080 0.067 0.054 0.070 0.034 0.023 0.254 0.170 0.212 0.176 
Rajasthan 0.052 0.084 0.062 0.146 0.041 0.004 0.116 0.025 0.124 0.086 
Sikkim 0.066 0.061 0.066 0.547 0.036 0.026 0.145 0.121 0.179 0.245 
Tamil Nadu 0.061 0.053 0.064 0.071 0.036 0.014 0.072 0.050 0.168 0.053 
Tripura 0.091 0.071 0.041 0.255 0.170 0.027 0.130 0.067 0.187 0.078 
Uttarakhand 0.044 0.041 0.057 0.020 0.029 0.031 0.073 0.056 0.182 0.206 
                                  
 
  
   
 Revenue receipts Own Tax Revenue Tax Transfers Own Non-Tax Revenue Grants 
  BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
Uttar Pradesh 0.067 0.097 0.040 0.142 0.031 0.022 0.249 0.175 0.220 0.216 
West Bengal 0.122 0.141 0.057 0.223 0.049 0.025 0.270 0.200 0.170 0.116 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
Table 11: Magnitude of Errors: Comparison of BE-Actuals with RE-Actuals for Revenue Deficit, Fiscal Deficit and Primary 
Deficit 
 Revenue Deficit Fiscal Deficit Primary Deficit 
  BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
Andhra Pradesh 0.672 0.640 0.136 0.073 0.362 0.240 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.441 0.441 0.818 0.643 0.985 0.718 
Assam 0.940 0.462 0.554 0.293 0.704 0.341 
Bihar 0.487 0.589 0.146 0.347 0.288 0.499 
Chhattisgarh 0.374 0.336 0.229 0.248 0.330 0.359 
Goa 0.590 0.551 0.371 0.364 0.741 0.736 
Gujarat 0.312 0.229 0.100 0.056 0.402 0.221 
Haryana 0.153 0.116 0.248 0.150 0.413 0.220 
Himachal  0.370 0.428 0.133 0.054 0.372 0.376 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.861 0.885 0.343 0.387 0.568 0.653 
Jharkhand 0.450 0.413 0.300 0.163 0.580 0.273 
Karnataka 0.496 0.302 0.035 0.051 0.082 0.103 
Kerala 0.532 0.501 0.417 0.376 0.612 0.572 
Madhya Pradesh 0.223 0.204 0.073 0.108 0.148 0.173 
Maharashtra 0.444 0.603 0.080 0.116 0.394 0.390 
Manipur 0.126 0.115 0.431 0.329 0.732 0.477 
Meghalaya 0.441 0.434 0.292 0.283 0.604 0.595 
Mizoram 0.312 0.438 0.617 0.446 0.567 0.513 
Nagaland 0.229 0.332 0.249 0.430 0.475 0.812 
                                  
 
  
   
 Revenue Deficit Fiscal Deficit Primary Deficit 
  BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
Orissa 0.455 0.251 0.307 0.236 0.393 0.269 
Punjab 0.265 0.148 0.537 0.189 0.706 0.251 
Rajasthan 0.443 0.123 0.316 0.055 0.490 0.075 
Sikkim 0.257 0.256 0.238 0.260 0.518 0.516 
Tamil Nadu 0.300 0.138 0.116 0.039 0.224 0.068 
Tripura 0.256 0.125 0.338 0.307 0.489 0.482 
Uttarakhand 0.255 0.154 0.174 0.051 0.379 0.104 
Uttar Pradesh 0.669 0.644 0.168 0.155 0.481 0.387 
West Bengal 0.636 0.166 0.199 0.067 0.856 0.399 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
  
                                  
 
  
   
VI.2:  Decomposition of Forecast Errors  
We have decomposed the error between systematic and unsystematic error. Systematic error is the sum of mean error and the slope error. The systematic error can be improved by using better forecasting techniques. The partitioning of sources of State-specific forecast 
errors are given in Appendix 1.  Within BE-Actuals partitioning, more than 20 States showed 
that the source of errors was systemic for capital expenditure.  
Figure 15: Randomness of Errors in Revenue Deficit (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
  
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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One can observe that merely 7 and 5 states in the budget estimates and revised 
estimates respectively of the capital expenditure have the random error more than 0.5. The 
average of the random errors of the budget estimate and the revised estimate is 0.31 and 0.24. 
Both the above observations tells us that the errors in capital expenditure are more because 
of systematic bias rather than being random.  
Figure 16: Randomness of Errors in Fiscal Deficit (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 17: Randomness of Errors in Primary Deficit (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 18: Randomness of Errors in Own Tax Revenue (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-
16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 19: Randomness of Errors in Tax Transfers (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 20: Randomness of Errors in Revenue Expenditure (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 
2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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Figure 21: Randomness of Errors in Capital Expenditure (BE-Actual), 2011-12 to 
2015-16 
 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
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   share in central taxes where 4 states have systematic error of over 50%), the former trend persists.  While there have been negligible improvements from the BE to the RE , that is, on average the number of states having systematic error of more than 50 per cent have changed marginally across the different categories of revenues and expenditure, the larger trend of the BE seems to persist. For instance, in categories such as tax revenue, state’s own tax revenue, share in central taxes, state’s own non tax revenue, revenue expenditure, revenue deficit and primary deficit, the number of states having systematic error of over fifty percent of total error has decreased. For the rest of the categories, the same has increased. However in both cases, the change has been only marginal.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
 Applying Theil’s U technique, we tried to analyse the errors of fiscal forecasts of 
subnational governments in India.  The fiscal marksmanship analysis showed that the 
forecast errors in revenue receipts has been greater than revenue expenditure. Within 
revenue receipts, the forecast errors in grants is the highest.  Within the public expenditure, 
the errors of capital expenditure forecasts showed greater deviations than revenue 
expenditure.  The analysis shows that in more than 20 States, the sources of error for systemic 
than random in case of a few macro-fiscal variables, with negligible improvements from BE 
to RE.  
  
Appendix 1: State-wise Partitioning the Errors  
 
 
Table 1: REVENUE DEFICIT: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
 Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.375 0.267 0.358 0.264 0.570 0.165 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.437 0.006 0.556 0.007 0.166 0.826 
Assam 0.193 0.013 0.794 0.461 0.324 0.215 
Bihar 0.394 0.089 0.517 0.437 0.051 0.512 
Chhattisgarh 0.247 0.250 0.503 0.035 0.226 0.739 
Goa 0.206 0.249 0.544 0.723 0.157 0.120 
Gujarat 0.001 0.105 0.895 0.013 0.085 0.902 
Haryana 0.587 0.206 0.207 0.000 0.491 0.509 
Himachal  0.294 0.001 0.705 0.163 0.170 0.668 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.448 0.384 0.167 0.333 0.348 0.319 
Jharkhand 0.707 0.001 0.292 0.366 0.114 0.520 
Karnataka 0.432 0.524 0.044 0.600 0.246 0.153 
Kerala 0.056 0.711 0.233 0.073 0.534 0.394 
Madhya Pradesh 0.396 0.115 0.489 0.444 0.123 0.433 
Maharashtra 0.385 0.393 0.222 0.025 0.129 0.845 
Manipur 0.000 0.018 0.982 0.018 0.308 0.787 
Meghalaya 0.767 0.022 0.210 0.668 0.000 0.332 
Mizoram 0.626 0.208 0.166 0.108 0.001 0.891 
Nagaland 0.498 0.327 0.175 0.343 0.235 0.423 
Orissa 0.892 0.023 0.085 0.897 0.001 0.102 
Punjab 0.710 0.185 0.105 0.080 0.371 0.548 
Rajasthan 0.270 0.516 0.214 0.500 0.315 0.185 
Sikkim 0.893 0.000 0.106 0.937 0.002 0.061 
Tamil Nadu 0.258 0.005 0.738 0.029 0.001 0.970 
Tripura 0.063 0.673 0.265 0.042 0.234 0.723 
Uttarakhand 0.176 0.260 0.564 0.154 0.651 0.195 
Uttar Pradesh 0.076 0.619 0.305 0.286 0.075 0.639 
West Bengal 0.873 0.001 0.127 0.389 0.005 0.606 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: FISCAL DEFICIT: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.077 0.309 0.613 0.076 0.302 0.623 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.018 0.256 0.726 0.430 0.072 0.498 
Assam 0.008 0.147 0.846 0.780 0.005 0.215 
Bihar 0.061 0.503 0.437 0.785 0.015 0.200 
Chhattisgarh 0.313 0.116 0.571 0.398 0.206 0.396 
Goa 0.830 0.068 0.102 0.848 0.077 0.075 
Gujarat 0.341 0.003 0.656 0.132 0.073 0.796 
Haryana 0.021 0.490 0.490 0.143 0.378 0.479 
Himachal  0.173 0.000 0.827 0.105 0.042 0.853 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.450 0.474 0.076 0.184 0.540 0.276 
Jharkhand 0.172 0.724 0.104 0.015 0.354 0.632 
Karnataka 0.025 0.555 0.420 0.006 0.603 0.390 
Kerala 0.084 0.562 0.354 0.077 0.407 0.516 
Madhya Pradesh 0.280 0.465 0.255 0.701 0.017 0.282 
Maharashtra 0.090 0.566 0.344 0.690 0.132 0.179 
Manipur 0.302 0.366 0.332 0.787 0.022 0.223 
Meghalaya 0.139 0.133 0.729 0.093 0.178 0.729 
Mizoram 0.181 0.688 0.131 0.385 0.019 0.596 
Nagaland 0.134 0.152 0.714 0.707 0.075 0.219 
Orissa 0.845 0.001 0.154 0.921 0.000 0.079 
Punjab 0.362 0.110 0.527 0.097 0.326 0.578 
Rajasthan 0.183 0.301 0.517 0.921 0.002 0.077 
Sikkim 0.462 0.094 0.444 0.860 0.080 0.060 
Tamil Nadu 0.153 0.539 0.307 0.336 0.262 0.402 
Tripura 0.772 0.153 0.075 0.759 0.192 0.049 
Uttarakhand 0.243 0.317 0.440 0.254 0.000 0.746 
Uttar Pradesh 0.002 0.375 0.623 0.016 0.470 0.514 
West Bengal 0.744 0.052 0.204 0.007 0.136 0.857 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: PRIMARY DEFICIT: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.224 0.510 0.266 0.112 0.504 0.384 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.024 0.320 0.655 0.430 0.063 0.507 
Assam 0.009 0.137 0.854 0.777 0.003 0.219 
Bihar 0.123 0.524 0.352 0.778 0.024 0.199 
Chhattisgarh 0.303 0.218 0.479 0.373 0.311 0.316 
Goa 0.853 0.017 0.129 0.867 0.033 0.100 
Gujarat 0.309 0.087 0.604 0.116 0.225 0.659 
Haryana 0.032 0.497 0.471 0.142 0.353 0.504 
Himachal  0.124 0.025 0.851 0.047 0.087 0.866 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.381 0.552 0.067 0.180 0.594 0.227 
Jharkhand 0.166 0.644 0.189 0.016 0.261 0.723 
Karnataka 0.200 0.379 0.420 0.008 0.693 0.299 
Kerala 0.084 0.693 0.223 0.080 0.578 0.343 
Madhya Pradesh 0.118 0.584 0.299 0.666 0.001 0.333 
Maharashtra 0.072 0.545 0.383 0.692 0.090 0.218 
Manipur 0.337 0.341 0.322 0.787 0.015 0.231 
Meghalaya 0.142 0.304 0.554 0.099 0.357 0.544 
Mizoram 0.283 0.569 0.148 0.351 0.006 0.643 
Nagaland 0.028 0.019 0.954 0.714 0.007 0.280 
Orissa 0.632 0.005 0.363 0.637 0.015 0.348 
Punjab 0.360 0.078 0.562 0.098 0.331 0.571 
Rajasthan 0.183 0.363 0.454 0.915 0.000 0.085 
Sikkim 0.437 0.119 0.444 0.851 0.093 0.056 
Tamil Nadu 0.170 0.590 0.241 0.313 0.301 0.386 
Tripura 0.795 0.130 0.075 0.689 0.279 0.033 
Uttarakhand 0.231 0.389 0.380 0.288 0.000 0.711 
Uttar Pradesh 0.017 0.399 0.584 0.025 0.521 0.454 
West Bengal 0.761 0.001 0.239 0.002 0.172 0.826 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: REVENUE RECEIPTS: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.478 0.191 0.331 0.365 0.375 0.260 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.482 0.004 0.513 0.286 0.078 0.635 
Assam 0.750 0.217 0.033 0.847 0.023 0.130 
Bihar 0.773 0.081 0.146 0.657 0.187 0.156 
Chhattisgarh 0.672 0.219 0.109 0.637 0.287 0.075 
Goa 0.772 0.068 0.160 0.721 0.051 0.229 
Gujarat 0.022 0.008 0.970 0.061 0.131 0.807 
Haryana 0.874 0.032 0.094 0.785 0.033 0.181 
Himachal  0.071 0.283 0.647 0.087 0.510 0.404 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.403 0.100 0.497 0.092 0.050 0.859 
Jharkhand 0.344 0.061 0.595 0.080 0.083 0.836 
Karnataka 0.073 0.151 0.776 0.144 0.273 0.582 
Kerala 0.380 0.001 0.619 0.004 0.290 0.706 
Madhya Pradesh 0.904 0.032 0.065 0.217 0.062 0.721 
Maharashtra 0.962 0.000 0.038 0.041 0.092 0.867 
Manipur 0.711 0.024 0.265 0.491 0.016 0.493 
Meghalaya 0.718 0.162 0.120 0.272 0.308 0.421 
Mizoram 0.007 0.015 0.977 0.027 0.501 0.472 
Nagaland 0.764 0.139 0.098 0.610 0.202 0.188 
Orissa 0.078 0.013 0.909 0.136 0.155 0.709 
Punjab 0.394 0.142 0.463 0.143 0.284 0.573 
Rajasthan 0.050 0.016 0.935 0.181 0.195 0.624 
Sikkim 0.006 0.650 0.343 0.017 0.427 0.556 
Tamil Nadu 0.895 0.020 0.085 0.078 0.038 0.884 
Tripura 0.363 0.599 0.038 0.016 0.022 0.961 
Uttarakhand 0.762 0.194 0.044 0.640 0.139 0.221 
Uttar Pradesh 0.651 0.124 0.225 0.072 0.003 0.925 
West Bengal 0.795 0.112 0.092 0.373 0.301 0.326 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: OWN TAX REVENUE: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals  RE-Actuals  
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
 Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.434 0.054 0.513 0.335 0.190 0.475 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.102 0.401 0.497 0.135 0.122 0.743 
Assam 0.182 0.781 0.037 0.205 0.476 0.319 
Bihar 0.513 0.411 0.076 0.424 0.182 0.394 
Chhattisgarh 0.364 0.588 0.049 0.422 0.531 0.046 
Goa 0.663 0.210 0.128 0.500 0.057 0.443 
Gujarat 0.120 0.796 0.084 0.004 0.402 0.593 
Haryana 0.558 0.374 0.068 0.625 0.315 0.060 
Himachal  0.001 0.000 0.998 0.021 0.001 0.978 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.212 0.028 0.760 0.205 0.040 0.755 
Jharkhand 0.664 0.295 0.041 0.574 0.379 0.047 
Karnataka 0.285 0.576 0.139 0.729 0.000 0.271 
Kerala 0.796 0.123 0.081 0.691 0.098 0.212 
Madhya Pradesh 0.006 0.891 0.103 0.000 0.371 0.628 
Maharashtra 0.000 0.719 0.280 0.067 0.389 0.544 
Manipur 0.164 0.702 0.135 0.184 0.228 0.685 
Meghalaya 0.014 0.458 0.529 0.053 0.408 0.538 
Mizoram 0.391 0.326 0.283 0.346 0.447 0.207 
Nagaland 0.272 0.434 0.294 0.365 0.016 0.619 
Orissa 0.068 0.001 0.931 0.163 0.000 0.837 
Punjab 0.864 0.048 0.088 0.873 0.092 0.034 
Rajasthan 0.084 0.859 0.058 0.162 0.795 0.044 
Sikkim 0.649 0.007 0.344 0.534 0.117 0.349 
Tamil Nadu 0.434 0.385 0.181 0.601 0.111 0.288 
Tripura 0.001 0.368 0.631 0.146 0.150 0.705 
Uttarakhand 0.589 0.383 0.028 0.421 0.444 0.135 
Uttar Pradesh 0.019 0.879 0.102 0.115 0.164 0.721 
West Bengal 0.693 0.063 0.244 0.438 0.106 0.456 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: TAX TRANSFERS: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals RE-Actuals 
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.230 0.002 0.768 0.362 0.000 0.638 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.435 0.286 0.279 0.039 0.004 0.957 
Assam 0.001 0.251 0.748 0.055 0.117 0.828 
Bihar 0.387 0.004 0.609 0.391 0.017 0.591 
Chhattisgarh 0.391 0.036 0.572 0.420 0.000 0.580 
Goa 0.001 0.094 0.905 0.109 0.159 0.732 
Gujarat 0.006 0.124 0.871 0.653 0.022 0.326 
Haryana 0.142 0.288 0.571 0.491 0.216 0.293 
Himachal  0.458 0.001 0.541 0.402 0.009 0.588 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.223 0.000 0.777 0.171 0.002 0.828 
Jharkhand 0.047 0.220 0.732 0.119 0.279 0.602 
Karnataka 0.092 0.146 0.762 0.261 0.022 0.717 
Kerala 0.079 0.084 0.837 0.279 0.020 0.701 
Madhya Pradesh 0.075 0.215 0.710 0.321 0.009 0.670 
Maharashtra 0.175 0.257 0.568 0.037 0.090 0.873 
Manipur 0.707 0.004 0.288 0.332 0.115 0.645 
Meghalaya 0.727 0.004 0.269 0.434 0.071 0.495 
Mizoram 0.000 0.142 0.857 0.018 0.006 0.976 
Nagaland 0.018 0.243 0.739 0.143 0.073 0.784 
Orissa 0.112 0.182 0.706 0.048 0.028 0.924 
Punjab 0.090 0.461 0.449 0.213 0.018 0.768 
Rajasthan 0.215 0.173 0.612 0.143 0.010 0.847 
Sikkim 0.651 0.002 0.346 0.317 0.005 0.678 
Tamil Nadu 0.263 0.202 0.535 0.423 0.012 0.566 
Tripura 0.164 0.532 0.304 0.168 0.523 0.309 
Uttarakhand 0.023 0.224 0.753 0.057 0.052 0.891 
Uttar Pradesh 0.169 0.305 0.526 0.332 0.001 0.667 
West Bengal 0.006 0.469 0.525 0.214 0.003 0.783 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 7: OWN NON-TAX REVENUE: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & 
RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals  RE-Actuals  
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.098 0.000 0.901 0.201 0.057 0.743 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.186 0.337 0.477 0.431 0.029 0.540 
Assam 0.620 0.157 0.223 0.375 0.000 0.625 
Bihar 0.796 0.013 0.191 0.268 0.051 0.681 
Chhattisgarh 0.652 0.268 0.080 0.546 0.351 0.103 
Goa 0.526 0.014 0.459 0.027 0.417 0.556 
Gujarat 0.047 0.060 0.893 0.240 0.335 0.425 
Haryana 0.446 0.363 0.191 0.503 0.179 0.318 
Himachal  0.007 0.070 0.923 0.018 0.042 0.940 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.207 0.017 0.776 0.320 0.055 0.625 
Jharkhand 0.429 0.316 0.255 0.453 0.375 0.172 
Karnataka 0.274 0.573 0.153 0.000 0.582 0.418 
Kerala 0.001 0.490 0.509 0.763 0.069 0.169 
Madhya Pradesh 0.009 0.166 0.824 0.189 0.016 0.795 
Maharashtra 0.522 0.340 0.138 0.719 0.072 0.209 
Manipur 0.923 0.063 0.014 0.536 0.118 0.404 
Meghalaya 0.188 0.000 0.811 0.121 0.013 0.866 
Mizoram 0.038 0.601 0.362 0.016 0.573 0.411 
Nagaland 0.726 0.163 0.110 0.431 0.016 0.552 
Orissa 0.204 0.549 0.247 0.388 0.314 0.298 
Punjab 0.127 0.073 0.801 0.651 0.019 0.331 
Rajasthan 0.010 0.414 0.576 0.067 0.281 0.651 
Sikkim 0.661 0.195 0.144 0.561 0.045 0.394 
Tamil Nadu 0.390 0.030 0.580 0.007 0.077 0.916 
Tripura 0.016 0.329 0.655 0.025 0.245 0.730 
Uttarakhand 0.261 0.435 0.304 0.224 0.237 0.540 
Uttar Pradesh 0.405 0.231 0.364 0.297 0.056 0.647 
West Bengal 0.344 0.056 0.600 0.150 0.050 0.800 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 8: GRANTS: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals  RE-Actuals  
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
 Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.329 0.242 0.429 0.310 0.159 0.532 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.375 0.091 0.534 0.243 0.234 0.523 
Assam 0.830 0.084 0.085 0.804 0.026 0.170 
Bihar 0.622 0.166 0.212 0.619 0.248 0.133 
Chhattisgarh 0.766 0.159 0.074 0.739 0.197 0.064 
Goa 0.755 0.000 0.245 0.671 0.000 0.328 
Gujarat 0.627 0.037 0.336 0.646 0.121 0.233 
Haryana 0.834 0.024 0.143 0.913 0.001 0.086 
Himachal  0.026 0.024 0.950 0.417 0.047 0.536 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.453 0.031 0.516 0.332 0.017 0.651 
Jharkhand 0.893 0.011 0.096 0.778 0.084 0.139 
Karnataka 0.179 0.013 0.808 0.339 0.036 0.625 
Kerala 0.494 0.010 0.496 0.749 0.010 0.241 
Madhya Pradesh 0.508 0.151 0.341 0.537 0.086 0.378 
Maharashtra 0.393 0.008 0.600 0.784 0.208 0.009 
Manipur 0.026 0.000 0.974 0.571 0.370 0.068 
Meghalaya 0.783 0.210 0.008 0.692 0.298 0.010 
Mizoram 0.660 0.301 0.039 0.722 0.000 0.278 
Nagaland 0.698 0.082 0.220 0.678 0.002 0.320 
Orissa 0.764 0.153 0.083 0.847 0.065 0.089 
Punjab 0.903 0.008 0.089 0.586 0.018 0.397 
Rajasthan 0.041 0.000 0.959 0.809 0.152 0.039 
Sikkim 0.835 0.006 0.159 0.416 0.011 0.072 
Tamil Nadu 0.060 0.011 0.929 0.414 0.399 0.187 
Tripura 0.331 0.344 0.325 0.671 0.228 0.101 
Uttarakhand 0.678 0.280 0.042 0.316 0.267 0.026 
Uttar Pradesh 0.769 0.194 0.037 0.693 0.205 0.102 
West Bengal 0.683 0.044 0.273 0.517 0.042 0.442 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 9: REVENUE EXPENDITURE: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & 
RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals  RE-Actuals  
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.467 0.260 0.273 0.035 0.001 0.964 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.152 0.708 0.140 0.684 0.224 0.092 
Assam 0.877 0.100 0.023 0.847 0.086 0.067 
Bihar 0.793 0.100 0.107 0.837 0.128 0.035 
Chhattisgarh 0.678 0.285 0.037 0.735 0.242 0.023 
Goa 0.881 0.079 0.040 0.847 0.062 0.091 
Gujarat 0.612 0.255 0.132 0.608 0.295 0.097 
Haryana 0.829 0.088 0.083 0.952 0.010 0.038 
Himachal  0.465 0.174 0.361 0.386 0.433 0.181 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.195 0.177 0.629 0.166 0.203 0.631 
Jharkhand 0.902 0.002 0.095 0.902 0.056 0.041 
Karnataka 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.005 
Kerala 0.226 0.174 0.600 0.206 0.057 0.736 
Madhya Pradesh 0.594 0.074 0.331 0.630 0.099 0.271 
Maharashtra 0.179 0.584 0.236 0.745 0.221 0.034 
Manipur 0.240 0.006 0.754 0.739 0.189 0.083 
Meghalaya 0.640 0.289 0.071 0.540 0.377 0.084 
Mizoram 0.002 0.631 0.367 0.730 0.170 0.100 
Nagaland 0.375 0.405 0.221 0.594 0.129 0.277 
Orissa 0.762 0.174 0.064 0.867 0.086 0.048 
Punjab 0.961 0.001 0.038 0.842 0.062 0.096 
Rajasthan 0.030 0.500 0.470 0.856 0.131 0.014 
Sikkim 0.720 0.193 0.087 0.791 0.167 0.041 
Tamil Nadu 0.263 0.411 0.326 0.830 0.110 0.060 
Tripura 0.781 0.147 0.072 0.771 0.100 0.129 
Uttarakhand 0.659 0.034 0.307 0.787 0.057 0.156 
Uttar Pradesh 0.695 0.220 0.085 0.770 0.002 0.228 
West Bengal 0.116 0.384 0.499 0.811 0.004 0.186 
Source: Finance Accounts of States and State Budget documents (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 10: CAPITAL EXPENDITURE: Sources of Forecast Errors (BE-ACTUALS & 
RE_ACTUALS) 
 
 BE-Actuals  RE-Actuals  
 Sources of Error Sources of Error 
  Bias Variance Random Bias Variance Random 
Andhra Pradesh 0.357 0.236 0.407 0.053 0.646 0.301 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.828 0.006 0.166 0.893 0.004 0.103 
Assam 0.813 0.112 0.075 0.767 0.167 0.066 
Bihar 0.756 0.003 0.241 0.738 0.009 0.254 
Chhattisgarh 0.894 0.073 0.033 0.851 0.122 0.027 
Goa 0.806 0.152 0.042 0.807 0.141 0.052 
Gujarat 0.481 0.199 0.321 0.638 0.172 0.190 
Haryana 0.105 0.008 0.887 0.018 0.046 0.936 
Himachal  0.196 0.005 0.800 0.554 0.317 0.129 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.443 0.035 0.522 0.461 0.041 0.498 
Jharkhand 0.728 0.205 0.067 0.791 0.070 0.139 
Karnataka 0.484 0.036 0.480 0.330 0.092 0.579 
Kerala 0.409 0.000 0.591 0.094 0.237 0.669 
Madhya Pradesh 0.317 0.532 0.152 0.315 0.085 0.600 
Maharashtra 0.980 0.001 0.019 0.696 0.252 0.052 
Manipur 0.463 0.256 0.281 0.906 0.050 0.051 
Meghalaya 0.854 0.127 0.019 0.777 0.192 0.031 
Mizoram 0.260 0.376 0.364 0.657 0.209 0.134 
Nagaland 0.918 0.004 0.079 0.722 0.154 0.123 
Orissa 0.024 0.910 0.065 0.064 0.179 0.757 
Punjab 0.797 0.001 0.202 0.909 0.007 0.084 
Rajasthan 0.167 0.061 0.772 0.872 0.013 0.115 
Sikkim 0.959 0.023 0.018 0.969 0.017 0.014 
Tamil Nadu 0.525 0.135 0.340 0.735 0.046 0.219 
Tripura 0.595 0.374 0.032 0.910 0.069 0.022 
Uttarakhand 0.027 0.047 0.926 0.529 0.094 0.378 
Uttar Pradesh 0.314 0.005 0.681 0.482 0.033 0.485 
West Bengal 0.864 0.041 0.095 0.854 0.140 0.006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
References 
 Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti, 1995.  The Political Economy of Budget Deficits. IMF Staff Papers (March), 1-32. 
 Allan, C M, 1965. “Fiscal Marksmanship, 1951-63”, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Volume 17. 
 Artis, Michael J. and Massimilano Marcellino, 2001. “Fiscal Forecasting: The Track Record of the IMF, OECD and EC”. Econometrics Journal, 4: S20-S36.    Asher, M. G. 1978. “Accuracy of Budgetary Forecasts of central Government, 1967-68 to 1975-76”, Economic and Political Weekly, 13(8). 
 Auerbach, Alan, 2017. “Fiscal Policy,” paper presented in the Conference on “Rethinking Macroeconomics” at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, Washington DC, October, 2017. 
 Auld, D A L 1970. “Fiscal Marksmanship in Canada”, The Canadian Journal of Economics. 
 Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Jensen, Henrik, 2004. “Mark-Up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a Monetary Union”, Journal of Macroeconomics 26, 357-376. 
 Bhattacharya, BB and Kumari A, 1988. “Budget Forecasts of Central Government Revenue and Expenditure: A Test of Rational Expectation”, Economic and Political Weekly. 
 Blanchard, Olivier, 1990. Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators. OECD Working Paper No. 79.  
 Bretschneider, Stuart I., Wilpen L. Gorr, Gloria Grizzle, and Earle Klay, 1989. “Political and Organizational influences on the Accuracy of Forecasting State Government Revenues”. 
International Journal of Forecasting, 5: 307-19. 
 Cassidy, Glenn, Mark. S. Kamlet, and Daniel S. Nagin, 1989. “An Empirical Examination of Bias in Revenue Forecasts by State Governments”. International Journal of Forecasting, 5: 321-31.  
 Chakrabarty, T K and Varghese, W. 1982. “The Government of India's Budget Estimation: An Analysis of the Error Components”, Reserve Bank of India, Occasional Papers. 
 Chakraborty, Lekha and Sinha, Darshy, 2018. “Has Fiscal Rule changed the fiscal marksmanship of Union Government”, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Working Paper No. 234. 
 Chakraborty, Lekha and Pinaki Chakraborty, 2018. “New FRBM Framework: Time to Recast Union Government Expenditure Needs”, Economic and Political Weekly, 53(9), 03 Mar, 2018. 
  
 Davis, J M, 1980. “Fiscal Marksmanship in the United Kingdom, 1951-1978”, The Manchester School. K, Nithin and Roy, Rathin 2015. “Finance Commission of India’s Assessment: A Political Economy Contention between Expectations and Outcomes”, Applied Economics, 48(2): 73-88. 
 Kopits, G 2001.  “Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?” IMF Working Paper No. 01/145, IMF. 
 Luisa Giuriato & Alessandra Cepparulo & Matteo Barberi, 2016. "Fiscal forecasts and political systems: a legislative budgeting perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 1-22, July. 
 Morrison, Rodney J, 1986. “Fiscal Marksmanship in the United States: 1950-1983”, The Manchester School.  
 Muth, J. F., 1961.  “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements”. Econometrica, 
Journal of the Econometric Society, 29: 315-335. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909635. 
 Pattnaik, R K, 1990. “Fiscal Marksmanship in India”, Reserve Bank of India Occasional Paper, 11(3). 
 Paul, S and Rangarajan C, 1974. “Short-Term Investment Forecasting”, Macmillan India. 
 Pina, A lvaro M. & Venes, Nuno M., 2011. "The political economy of EDP fiscal forecasts: An empirical assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, 27(3): 534-546, September. 
 Shrestha Ruzel and Lekha Chakraborty, 2019. Practising Subnational Public Finance in an Emerging Economy: Fiscal Marksmanship in Kerala, NIPFP WP 261.  
 Stephan, Andreas; and Bru ck, Tilman, 2005. Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?, The Postgraduate Research Programme working paper series / Europa-Universita t Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Graduiertenkolleg "Kapitalma rkte und Finanzwirtschaft im erweiterten Europa", No. 2005,5. 
 Theil, H. 1958. “Economic Forecasts and Policy.” Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 Xisco Oliver Joan Rossello , 2016. “Determinants of budget forecast errors in federal economies: 1995-2014”, RIFDE Discussion Paper. 9/2016. 
 
